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Culture, Cloaked in Mens Rea
Proof beyond reasonable doubt of the mens
rea or state of mind associated with a particu-
lar crime is a requirement for the successful
prosecution of all criminal defendants under
our system of justice. In the legal jargon, it
is part of the prosecution’s prima facie case.
Concomitantly, criminal defendants may suc-
cessfully challenge the case against them on the
ground (among others) that the prosecution has
failed to meet this requirement. In this con-
text one of the essential remaining disputes is
waged among legal scholars and practitioners
about the propriety of the ‘‘cultural defense’’ in
cases involving immigrant crime.1 Speciﬁcally,
there is disagreement about the admissibility of
evidence about immigrant culture and cultural
practices in support of the argument that the
defendant suﬀered from a form of cultural ‘‘di-
minished capacity’’ or ‘‘insanity’’ at the time of
the crime. There also is ongoing debate about
the admissibility of such evidence in support
of the aﬃrmative defense of provocation. While
the latter is technically not directed at mens rea,
like diminished capacity and insanity, it is intro-
duced to explain the defendant’s loss of control
in the face of an extreme emotional disturbance.
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In support of the position that evidence about immigrant culture can and
should be permitted to explain an immigrant’smental state or his or her loss
of control, its proponents, especially practitioners, have suggested that cul-
tural predispositions can and often do aﬀect free will.Or, their colleagues in
the academy argue that a sensitivity and even acquiescence to culture in this
context is critical to fair results in criminal cases conducted in a pluralistic
society. And some have taken a narrower and intermediate view, suggesting
that evidence of immigrant culture ought to be admissible, but exclusively
in those cases where the charge against the defendant is based on his or
her actions or reactions to culturally based subordination. In other words,
they argue for culturally based aﬃrmative action in assessing culpability. In
my view, each of these arguments is ultimately a pragmatic one: mens rea is
the sole inquiry in the guilt phase of criminal proceedings that formally is
concerned with the defendant’s state of mind and insuring at least the pos-
sibility of an outright exoneration in cases involving clashes of competing
(American and immigrant) cultures is crucial for certain segments of the
immigrant community.2
Otherswho take a contrary view of the use of immigrant cultural evidence
in this context argue that the eﬀort to cloak immigrant culture in themantle
of mens rea is illogical on the facts of the cases at issue, which, they suggest,
show the exercise rather than the alteration of free will. They also argue that
the eﬀort is inconsistent with existing law and traditional liberal theory—
which is both intentionally and strongly nondiscriminatory—and thus ulti-
mately should be seen for what it is: a disguised attempt to have the courts
accept informally that which they could not and should not accept formally,
an aﬃrmative defense to immigrant crime that would undermine the native
American culture’s fealty to the uniform application of its criminal laws. I
fall squarely in the latter camp, and in this essay I amplify the case for my
position. As I have done in the past, I also demonstrate that this view is not
anti-immigrant or antiminority, but rather, in strong support of immigrants
who would seek the protection of the laws and cultural inclinations of the
United States.3 In this regard, in particular, I also explain the fundamen-
tal distinctions between equal protection–based calls for aﬃrmative action
in education and employment and similar calls in the context of criminal
evidence law.
The best way to accomplishmy objectives is to start at the beginning, with
the  decision of a New York Superior Court in the case People v. Chen.4
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While there may be some debate about this, I believe that Chen, along with
the California decision in People v. Kimura, initiated this discussion in its
current iteration.5 More important and because it transpired in a relative
historical vacuum,Chen is perhaps the clearest example of themisuse of cul-
tural evidence in themens rea context. Because it is raw in this respect,Chen
also is the perfect paradigm through which to view both doctrinal and theo-
retical arguments about the propriety of the ‘‘cultural defense’’ to immigrant
crime. Indeed, even to the extent that my own viewpoint with respect to the
various arguments for and against the use of cultural evidence is contested
or even rejected, the contrary positions and competing rationales also are
laid out, making at least the possibilities clear. Such clarity is critical in this
area of the law that is becoming the subject of increasing practical attention,
and because the existing literature largely fails to provide such guidance.
Dong Lu Chen and his wife, Jian Wan Chen, immigrated from China to
the United States in September  when Chen was ﬁfty years old.6 Ac-
cording to Leti Volpp, he ﬁrst ‘‘worked as a dishwasher in Maryland, [and]
Jian Wan Chen and the three children stayed in New York. During a visit
when Jian Wan Chen refused to have sex with him and ‘became abusive,’
Dong LuChen became suspicious that shewas having an aﬀair.He returned
to Maryland, burdened with the stress of his wife’s assumed inﬁdelity.’’7
Then, ‘‘in June , Dong Lu Chen moved to New York,’’8 where he is said
to have obtained work as a garment factory worker.9 According to the de-
fense,
On August  he rushed into his wife’s bedroom and grabbed her
breasts and vaginal area. They felt more developed to him and he took
that as a sign that she was having aﬀairs.When he confronted her the
next day, she said she was seeing another man.On September , when
he again confronted her and said he wanted to have sex, ‘‘she said I
won’t let you hold me because I have other guys who will do this.’’ His
head felt dizzy, and he ‘‘pressed her down and asked her for how long
had this been going on. She responded, for three months.’’ Confused
and dizzy, he picked something up and hit her a couple of times on the
head. He passed out.10
In fact, on the morning of September , , Dong Lu Chen ‘‘smashed
[his wife’s] skull with a claw hammer.’’11 He is said to have struck eight
times.12 According to Volpp,
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The forensic pathologist [who testiﬁed in the case] reported that Jian
Wan Chen was ﬁve foot three and weighted  pounds. Her body was
foundwith numerous carved lacerations on both sides of her head. She
had contusions on both left and right forearms, a contusion onher right
wrist, an abrasion at the back of her left hand, and a bruise on her left
thumb. The marks on her head were consistent with having been hit
by a hammer. There were depressed skull fractures under her lacera-
tions, indicating that a great amount of force was applied to a small
surface area.The injuries on her arms, wrist, and hand were consistent
with someone holding her or with her warding oﬀ a blow from a ham-
mer. They were also consistent with an individual holding her down
and striking her in the face with a hammer.13
A reporter who covered the story explained further that ‘‘when [Chen] was
done, he didn’t run. He didn’t even change his bloody shirt. And when his
teen-age son camehome, hemet the boy at the door and announced, ‘I killed
your mother.’ ’’14 Jian Wan ‘‘Chen’s body was discovered by [the] teenage[r]
in the family’s Brooklyn apartment.’’15 Based on these facts, Elizabeth Holz-
man, the district attorney responsible for the case, formally charged Chen
with second-degree murder, which is deﬁned by subdivision . of the
New York Penal Law as follows:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree [punishable by a
minimum of ﬁfteen to twenty-ﬁve years in prison] when: () With in-
tent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such
person . . . except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an
aﬃrmative defense that: (a) The defendant acted under the inﬂuence of
extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable expla-
nation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from
the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situationunder the circum-
stances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this
paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a
conviction of,manslaughter in the ﬁrst degree or any other crime; or . . .
() Under circumstances evincing a depraved indiﬀerence to human
life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death
to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person.16
The New York legislature enacted part ()(a) of this provision with the ex-
press intent that so-called crimes of passion—crimes that were, in the his-
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torical jargon, ‘‘provoked’’ speciﬁcally by thewife’s decision to stray from the
marital bed—would be dealt with asmanslaughter in the ﬁrst degree, rather
than as second-degree murder. Manslaughter in the ﬁrst degree, otherwise
known as voluntary manslaughter, is deﬁned in subdivision . of the
New York Penal Law: ‘‘When () With intent to cause serious physical in-
jury to another person, he causes the death of such person . . . ; or () with
intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such per-
son . . . under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he
acts under the inﬂuence of extreme emotional disturbance, as deﬁned in
paragraph (a) of subdivision ..’’17 In structuring the law in this way, the
legislature also broadened the rather narrow historical category of ‘‘provo-
cation’’ so that this category now encompasses any circumstance that would
cause a reasonable person to lose the self-control presumed by the law.
Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice Edward Pincus was assigned to Chen’s
case, and he sat without a jury.18 At trial, Chen admitted that he killed
his wife because she had committed adultery.19 To avoid the conviction
for second-degree murder that otherwise naturally would ﬂow from such
an admission—and thereby to ensure at least a reduction of the charge
to ﬁrst-degree or voluntary manslaughter—Chen’s lawyer, Stewart Orden,
devised a defense strategy that included the traditional argument under
.()(a) that Chen had ‘‘acted under the inﬂuence of extreme emotional
disturbance.’’ At the same time, in what appears to have been an eﬀort to
reduce the charge even further, to second-degree or involuntarymanslaugh-
ter, Orden devised the separate and (on the facts) extremely diﬃcult argu-
ment that he killed his wife only involuntarily, or unintentionally.20 Under
subdivision . of the New York Penal Law, ‘‘a person is guilty of man-
slaughter in the second degree when: () he recklessly causes the death of
another person.’’21 While voluntary manslaughter carries a penalty of ‘‘up
to twenty-ﬁve years in prison,’’ involuntary manslaughter is punishable by
‘‘up to ﬁfteen years in prison.’’22 To both of these ends, Orden sought and
obtained leave from the judge to introduce evidence ofChen’s ‘‘cultural back-
ground [to explain his] state of mind.’’23
Speciﬁcally,Orden’s legal theory was that Chen ‘‘lacked the requisite state
of mind for murder and involuntary manslaughter because [his] culture
made it reasonable for him to perceive and to respond to the situation in a
violent way.’’24 To this end, Orden produced Burton Pasternak, an anthro-
pology professor at Hunter College who had done ﬁeld work in China in
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the period –, who testiﬁed that ‘‘ ‘adultery [is] going to make a Chi-
nese man more prone to violence’ ’’ than an American man.25 More speciﬁ-
cally, Pasternak testiﬁed that ‘‘ ‘in the Chinese context, adultery by a woman
was considered a kind of ‘‘stain’’ upon the man, indicating that he had lost
‘‘the most minimal standard of control’’ over her.’ . . . ‘The Chinese male
would . . . be considered a ‘‘pariah’’ amongChinesewomenbecause hewould
be viewed as having been unable to ‘‘maintain the most minimal standard
of control’’ within his family.’ ’’26 As a result, Pasternak explained that ‘‘if
[Chen] was a normal [Chinese] person, it’s not the United States, [he] would
react very violently. [He] might very well have confusion. It would be very
likely to be a chaotic situation.’’27
Separately, and in support of the argument that Chen actually did not in-
tend to kill or even severely to injure his wife, Pasternak testiﬁed that ‘‘in tra-
ditional Chinese culture, due to societal beliefs concerning inﬁdelity, a Chi-
nese man might threaten to kill his wife if she commits adultery. However,
the Chinese community usually stops him from following through with his
threats. ‘‘ ‘Mr. Chen argued that in the United States he did not have a tight-
knit Chinese community to stop him frommurdering his wife.’ ’’28This sug-
gested an alleged traditional practice, a theatrical production of sorts, involv-
ing a cuckolded man who merely pretends to want to kill his wife and who
takes an initial step in furtherance of this pretense in order to dispel the
tremendous shame that accompanies the provocation, only to be prevented
from accomplishing his unintended objective by a knowledgeable commu-
nity that dutifully intervenes to save his wife and simultaneously restore his
honor: ‘‘Chen was described by Orden as a product of China, where, it was
alleged, inﬁdelity is treated as a shameful slur on theman’s ancestral family.
Chen didn’t intend to kill his wife,Orden claimed.Chen was just ‘confused’
when he wielded the hammer, because of stress rooted in his cultural heri-
tage.’’29
Finally, and in support of both arguments, the defense presented Chen as
a man whose every move was culturally prescribed. For example, Pasternak
testiﬁed that
the ability of the Chinese community to deﬁne values and deﬁne appro-
priate behavior compared to our own ability to do that is extraordinary.
The ability to enforce those values and to protect themselves against
deviation also is extraordinary. The Chinese who grows up as a person
in Mainland China carries that in his mind. They are like voices of his
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community. It is very diﬃcult to escape. They are very intolerant [of ]
deviations from those mores, very intolerant, and exert enormous con-
trol over people who try to deviate. You carry that with you no matter
where you go. Even if you can escape those voices, you cannot escape
the information, a deviation being known to everyone, being known to
everyone in the Chinese community either here or there. My Chinese
friends often say, there is no wall that the wind cannot penetrate.These
voices will be heard everywhere.30
This notion that Chen lacked free will, that he was, in eﬀect, controlled by
the ‘‘voice of [the Chinese] community’’ that ‘‘will be heard everywhere’’ was
a central theme of Chen’s defense.
The prosecution, in a move some commentators have called incompre-
hensible, chose not to respond directly to any of Chen’s cultural evidence.
It did not challenge the accuracy of Pasternak’s testimony, nor did it seek to
introduce competing cultural evidence. Indeed, Brooklyn district attorney
Elizabeth Holzman believed the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible
on the ground that ‘‘ ‘foreign customs should not override American law.’ ’’31
And Kenneth Rigby, the assistant district attorney who actually litigated the
case said, ‘‘ ‘In our wildest imaginations, we couldn’t conjure up a scenario
where the judge would believe that anthropological hocus-pocus.’ ’’32 As a
result, Judge Pincus heard no rebuttal testimony on Chinese culture and
the matter of adultery, and he heard no rebuttal testimony on the ability of
culture more generally to inﬂuence a defendant’s mental state.
After considering all of the evidence, the judge agreed with the defense
that Chen ‘‘was driven to violence by traditional Chinese values about adul-
tery and loss of manhood.’’33 In the judge’s view, ‘‘ ‘Chen was the product
of his culture. . . . The culture was never an excuse, but it is something
that made him crack more easily. That was the factor, the cracking fac-
tor.’ ’’34Based on this analysis, the judge concluded that Chenwas guilty only
of ‘‘second-degree manslaughter: reckless homicide without intent.’’35 This
conclusion would cement Chen’s designation as the paradigm ‘‘cultural de-
fense’’ case, as the judge acknowledged that ‘‘ ‘were this crime committed
by the defendant as someone who was born and raised in America, or born
elsewhere but primarily raised in America, even in the Chinese American
community, the Court would have been constrained to ﬁnd the defendant
guilty of manslaughter in the ﬁrst degree.’ ’’36 The culturally premised re-
duction fromﬁrst- to second-degreemanslaughter, coupledwith the judge’s
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related concern about ‘‘ ‘the possible eﬀect of Chen’s incarceration on his
daughters’ marriage prospects’ ’’37 allowed Chen to walk out of jail a rela-
tively free man.With respect to the latter, the judge noted, ‘‘ ‘Now there’s a
stigma of shame on the whole family.’ ‘They have young, unmarried daugh-
ters. To make them marriageable prospects, they must make sure he suc-
ceeds so they succeed.’ ’’38
And so the judge ensured that Chen succeeded, but at what expense? As
I imply, the cost lay in a legal separation of American and Chinese defen-
dants based on their alleged cultural backgrounds. That is, the rule of Chen
(if there is one) may be stated as follows: While all men may be angry, pro-
voked to violence even, by their wives’ adulterous behavior, Chinese men
due to cultural inﬂuences may become so angry that their capacity for rea-
soned thought (even despite a cooling oﬀ period) will be so diminished as to
rob them of themental capacity to form intent.This culturally basedmental
disorder or state of ‘‘diminished capacity’’ may, in turn, cause Chinese men
to act as if on cultural automatic-pilot—or in a culturally induced hypnotic
state—according to a specially prescribed traditional practice that will re-
store their honor and physically protect their wives.Where this is the case,
Chinese men will be allowed a further reduction in the charge, from volun-
tary to involuntary manslaughter, a result not available to men outside the
Chinese (or similar) culture that causes the incapacity.
This assessment of the facts and the ‘‘rule’’ that derives from them is
ﬂawed in at least ﬁve respects. First, it is doctrinally ﬂawed because there is
no basis in the facts even as presented by the defense to support a reduction
of the charge against Chen to involuntary manslaughter. Second, the result
is logically impossible: one cannot simultaneously lose one’smind, even for
amoment, and reﬂect this loss in the exercise of a culturally appropriate tra-
ditional practice. Third, the result is ﬂawed because it assumes erroneously
that culture can deprive an individual of his ability to exercise free will in a
sense that is legally and philosophically cognizable; more speciﬁcally in this
context, it assumes (again erroneously) that immigrant or minority culture
can deprive amember of that culture of the ability to conformhis behavior to
majoritarian norms. Fourth, theChen result is anathema to theConstitution
and its philosophical foundations, which contemplate the equal treatment
of both defendants and victims of crime, as well as the establishment and
existence of the criminal laws as a common boundary of individual liberty.
Fifth, the result is also anathema to the very political philosophy on which
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proponents of the cultural defense rely. That is, liberal theory contemplates
that the United States will be a tolerant and ideologically plural nation; how-
ever, the absolute outer boundaries of that tolerance are established by the
criminal laws that are thought to be necessary to the proper ordering of the
society, and thus immutable. I address each of these ﬁve points in turn.
First, the result inChen is doctrinally ﬂawed because, although the record
may support a ﬁnding that Chen was provoked to attack his wife, there is
simply no basis in the facts to conclude that he acted ‘‘recklessly’’ rather than
‘‘intentionally’’ with respect to her death. As we have seen, the relevant law
provides that ‘‘a person is guilty ofmanslaughter in the second degreewhen:
() he recklessly causes the death of another person.’’39 This is in contrast
to the mental state required for voluntary manslaughter that is found when
‘‘with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such
person . . . under circumstances which do not constitute murder because
he acts under the inﬂuence of extreme emotional disturbance.’’40 A man
who is provoked to kill his adulterous wife is the paradigm case of voluntary
manslaughter. A person is said to act ‘‘recklessly’’ toward another when he
‘‘is aware that his conduct might cause the result [here the death] though it
is not substantially certain to happen.’’41 This is in contrast to the deﬁnition
of ‘‘intent,’’ which is found when the defendant desires the consequences or
‘‘knows that his conduct is substantially certain to cause the result, whether
or not he desires the result to occur.’’42 ‘‘Death’’ for both manslaughter and
murder is deﬁned as death or serious bodily injury. Thus, to rule as Judge
Pincus did, that Dong Lu Chen did not ‘‘know that his conduct [wa]s sub-
stantially certain’’ to cause JianWan Chen’s death, or that he knew only that
‘‘his conduct might’’ cause her death, would require a ﬁnding that Chen did
not know that eight vicious blows from a claw hammer to his wife’s skull
‘‘would’’ or ‘‘was substantially certain to’’ be deadly; it also would require
ﬁnding that he understood that such a vicious attack only ‘‘might’’ be deadly.
Such subtlety is not present on the facts of theChen case. Indeed, to the con-
trary, all of the evidence points either to the fact that Chen was provoked and
thus intended his wife serious bodily harm or death, or to the fact that he
was delusional and had no inkling that she was in any danger at all.
Even if we assume for purposes of this discussion that Chen’s evidence
(stripped or not of its cultural veneer) supported either a traditional or a
modern provocation defense, this could have resulted only in a reduction in
the charge from murder to voluntary manslaughter, since provocation as-
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sumes that the defendant, acting ‘‘in the heat of passion,’’ in fact intended
his victim serious bodily harm or death. There is simply no basis in that
doctrine to argue for a further reduction of the charge to involuntary man-
slaughter. Thus, to explain the further reduction, we must look beyond the
provocation defense to Chen’s second theory, based on an alleged Chinese
traditional practice, that raising the claw hammer was not a sign that he
intended his wife any real harm but rather a signal to the Chinese commu-
nity that it should come immediately to save her. It was essential for Chen’s
defense in this respect that cultural evidence be admitted, since, without
it, no American fact ﬁnder—in other words, no jury or judge acting as fact
ﬁnder—wouldﬁnd credible the argument thatChennever intendedhiswife
serious harm.Rather than oﬀering such proof, however,Chen’s defense pre-
sented testimony throughPasternak that was likely a ﬁgment of that anthro-
pologist’s imagination, ‘‘his own American fantasy’’ according to Volpp.43
Even if, however, one were to suspend disbelief (as the judge apparently did)
and credit that testimony, the doctrinal result would not be ‘‘recklessness’’
and a charge of involuntary manslaughter but rather an outright acquittal.
That is, to the extent that Chen still believed in the inevitability of a com-
munity rescue as he raised the murder weapon—at which moment he was
hearing ‘‘the voices ofChinese culture’’ calling to him to enact this ritual—he
was not conscious of a real risk of harm to his wife but fully delusional. The
insanity defense, or a defense of involuntary action based on the sleepwalk-
ing or automatism cases, provide the most appropriate doctrinal theories in
that circumstance and would result not in a conviction of involuntary man-
slaughter but a judgment that fully absolved the defendant of responsibility
for any crime.44
In the end then, the best case for Chen under existing criminal law doc-
trine was that he was a man who happened to be from China, who was truly
upset that his wife repeatedly had rejected his sexual advances, and who
thought (perhaps in the heat of passion) that his wife should die for her sins
and for his shame. This is the traditional stuﬀ of voluntary manslaughter.45
That the judge gave Chen a better deal under these circumstances implies
an old racist perspective—about the propensities of ‘‘others’’ to violence and
about the relative insigniﬁcance of their victims—that has formally been re-
jected in the law. It also implies a more modern political view about cultural
relativism that, whatever its merits otherwise, has no basis in applicable
legal doctrine.
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While several commentators have approved the use of the cultural de-
fense, and a few speciﬁcally of its application in Chen, none has explained
the court’s use of culture to eﬀect the reduction of Chen’s oﬀense from vol-
untary to involuntary manslaughter. As a result, it is unclear whether their
approval includes the outcome in the case or simply the use of cultural evi-
dence to prove provocation and thus to establish a defense that is common
to the criminal law without regard to the particular culture out of which
the provocation arises. As I show, however, a cultural defense in the sense
of the Chen result cannot be justiﬁed on the basis of any existing doctrine.
Indeed, while some have argued—based, for example, on an uncritical com-
mitment to pluralism—on behalf of the exoneration or quasi-exoneration
allowed in Chen and analogous cases, the law as it exists would have to be
changed substantially in order to accomplish this end.
My second criticism of the cultural defense is that it is generally ‘‘dis-
ingenuous because it relies upon an illogical and contorted analysis of the
mens rea requirement at issue.’’46 That is, ‘‘the immutable ﬂaw in th[e] argu-
ment [that ‘custom caused a mental disease or defect, or something short of
that, that impaired the defendant’s ability to think rationally’] is that cultural
evidence of custom conﬂicts with the impaired state of mind paradigm of
these doctrines. . . . By deﬁnition, the custom is alleged to be the normal,
traditional, sane practice under the circumstances. Indeed, in most cases
defendants present evidence that their actions were planned and executed
in full compliance with an established custom.’’47 In this respect,Chen’s de-
fense was internally inconsistent: He argued simultaneously that his rage
was governed by his cultural predispositions to such an extent that he be-
came mentally unstable, and that he purposefully acted his part in a cultur-
ally rational traditional practice. The only way to resolve this inconsistency
is to accept the premise that culture can alter free will, that it can result, for
example, in a state of cultural automatism, insanity, or diminished capacity.
As I argue below, this premise is ultimately untenable inU.S. jurisprudence.
Therefore, once again, the best we can say about Chen’s evidence is that it
establishes him as a man who killed his wife, either because he was so en-
raged by her adultery that he tried to kill her, or that he acted to defend his
honor in the only way his culture recognized but that the community that
would have saved her in China did not exist in the United States.
On this point, I am in substantial agreement with other commentators,
including those with whom I otherwise disagree. For example, in a 
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article in which Alison Dundes Renteln argues that the cultural defense
ought to operate as a ‘‘partial excuse,’’ she notes:
Immigrants and refugees in most cultural defense cases are, in fact,
perfectly sane according to the standards of their own culture, and, in-
deed, according to Western clinical standards. Giving them no option
other than an insanity defense to present the cultural dimension of the
case would require a gross falsiﬁcation of the facts. Furthermore, com-
paring the logic of immigrants with that of the insane is, at the very
least, insulting. . . . Such a comparison, even if successful as a strategy
for avoiding incarceration, would require the ethnocentric assessment
of the perspectives of other peoples.48
Renteln’s work is notable for being among the ﬁrst important pieces of legal
scholarship in this area, and it continues to resonate in the most recent
articles and essays on the subject.
For example, James J. Sing, in an article criticizingmy application of equal
protection doctrine to the cultural defense cases, concurs that ‘‘both critics
and advocates of the cultural defense have noted that the use of the insanity
doctrine to try cultural defense claims leads to the undesirable legal asso-
ciation of culturally informed actions and criminally insane behavior.’’ He
goes on to explain his own view, with which I agree, that the
application of temporary-insanity doctrine logically precludes intro-
duction of cultural evidence. . . . this theory is at odds with the basic
notion underlying all cultural defense claims that the defendant’s for-
eign culture functions as a legitimate yet alternative source of norms.
. . . The problem . . . is that the logic of the cultural defense focuses
not on the linkages between culture and ‘‘irrational’’ mental defect, but
rather on the very rational process by which culture inﬂuences people’s
behavior. . . . Mental defect of any stripe implies a sense of abnormality
that d[oes] not obtain in the defense attorney’s analytic scheme. . . . To
claim that nearly everyone from a given culture is abnormal (or even
possesses the same latent capacity for abnormality) is nonsensical be-
cause it is simply to assert a deﬁnition of what is ‘‘normal.’’ Such rhe-
toricalmaneuvering illustrates that the real illogic lies perhaps notwith
[the defendant’s] criminal behavior, but rather in the defense’s charac-
terization of the defendant as ‘‘cultural/defective.’’49
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My third criticism of the use of cultural evidence in the state-of-mind
context centers on the notion of free will in the law. There is much lit-
erature to support the general premise that human behavior is dictated or
at least strongly suggested by a combination of genetics and environment
—the classic ‘‘nature and nurture’’ paradigm—and to support the further
premise that culture constitutes an important aspect of the environmental
component. Thus, lawyers and legal academics, philosophers and anthro-
pologists talk about ‘‘enculturation,’’ ‘‘memetics,’’ or ‘‘meme theory,’’ and
‘‘cultural determinism.’’50 Nevertheless, ‘‘the general presumption in the
criminal law is that behavior is a consequence of free will.’’51 This presump-
tion is said to ‘‘ﬁnd its intellectual roots in [Emmanuel] Kant’s insistence
that moral agency is the central feature of personhood.’’52 According to
Linda Ross Meyer, ‘‘Essential to [Kant’s vision of ] moral agency is the ca-
pacity to will, which, for Kant, is to act in accordance with the conception of
laws, rather than be passively subjected to forces of nature. Acting in accor-
dance with the conception of laws requires that our thoughts be free, free to
follow logic rather than the random ﬂuctuations of brain chemistry, free to
make sense.’’ In the end, this Kantian vision was codiﬁed in the law, which
as a result, operates on the assumption that liberal society is ‘‘a union of rea-
sonable moral agents who respect each other and live under common laws
of reason.’’53
Of course, the fact that this is the way things are, and that any argu-
ment seeking to change such an understanding will face substantial institu-
tional opposition, does not justify anything from a moral perspective. Thus,
for example, when Joseph Grano derides arguments in support of ‘‘new
deterministic defenses—drug addiction, brainwashing, battered wife syn-
drome, post-traumatic stress, and just plain rotten social background’’—
and explains that ‘‘the view that the blame for crime lies with society rather
than with the individual oﬀender did not have much popular appeal even in
the s, and it has even less appeal today as crime runs rampant in our
cities,’’54 he is not telling us anything about why we do not have or could not
develop a justice theory that is suﬃciently ﬂexible to include consideration
of social or cultural inﬂuences on behavior. I disagree strongly to the extent
that Grano’s larger thesis implies that group identity is always irrelevant to
the law’s treatment of individual members of the society. However, it would
be disingenuous not to acknowledge the evident practical and philosophical
necessity of the particular legal presumption he treats in this context, that
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the criminal law is properly wedded to the notion of free will, even if it is in
some instances a legal ﬁction.
Indeed, the basic rationales for that presumption must be the following:
First, the social compact could not have existed and cannot survive in the
absence of individual responsibility. That is, a collection of individuals each
lacking responsibility for the harmhe or shemight do to others simply could
not sustain itself. Second, to the extent that theories explaining the absence
of free will apply literally to all of us, their eﬀect is to deny that there is
any normative purpose for the penal law as it exists or even as it might be
reconceived, and thus to admit that the social compact cannot ensure an
ordered community.While some lament and even vilify what they view as
the emptymantra of ‘‘social order,’’ there is no historical example of a society
that functioned or functions positively for its individual members and suc-
cessfully as a whole without it. As Michael Waltzer has written, in his book
On Toleration, ‘‘no [political] arrangement . . . is a moral option unless it pro-
vides for some version of peaceful coexistence (and thereby upholds basic
human rights.) We choose [from among relatively tolerant forms of govern-
ment] within limits.’’55And thus, whenChen’s defense decided to rest on the
notion that he was governed in all respects by the ‘‘voices of his [mainland
Chinese] community’’ rather than by his individual assessment of right and
wrong and by the very diﬀerent cultural norms that are codiﬁed in U.S. law,
it may or may not have been factually accurate, but it certainly was wrong
with respect to this original and essential presumption.
My fourth criticism is that, even if one otherwise were to accept the via-
bility of Chen’s defense, it is inherently discriminatory and thus in conﬂict
with strong antidiscrimination principles embedded primarily in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. As I explain elsewhere,
Tolerance of the use of immigrant cultural evidence in [this context]
fundamentally conﬂicts with the principle that ‘‘the protections given
by the laws of the United States shall be equal in respect to life and lib-
erty . . . [for] all persons.’’ Indeed, permitting cultural evidence to be
dispositive in criminal cases violates both the fundamental principle
that society has a right to government protection against crime, and the
equal protection doctrine that holds that whatever protections are pro-
vided by government must be provided to all equally, without regard
to race, gender, or national origin.56
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U.S. culture and law today indisputably arewedded to this principle, espe-
cially in their more progressive incarnations. The fact that this marriage has
grown out of a rejection of our own ‘‘long and unfortunate history with slave
and black codes and gender discriminatory laws’’ ensures that we are un-
likely even for arguably good reasons to develop the new ‘‘culture codes’’
suggested by the application of the cultural defense in Chen. The result
in that case squarely violated the antidiscrimination principle when ‘‘the
judge . . . eﬀectively carved out a group—‘people from China’—and distin-
guished them from others in society for purposes of applying the state’s
criminal laws. The result of this classiﬁcation was that, at least in that court-
room on that day, the state’s criminal code did not apply to ‘people from
China’ [either defendants or their victims] in the same manner as it applied
to others.’’57
Two other commentators have addressed directly the equal protection
challenge posed by the use of cultural evidence to negatemens rea or to show
provocation.
First, Leti Volpp has suggested that the Equal Protection Clause in this
context ought to be interpreted according to ‘‘antisubordination’’ rather than
‘‘antidiscrimination’’ doctrine. While antidiscrimination doctrine presup-
poses a racially and ethnically neutral Equal Protection Clause,58 Volpp ar-
gues that antisubordination doctrine presupposes the need for or at least
the propriety of positive action to elevate oppressed members of the society
ultimately to ensure that the promises of that clause are kept.59 She suggests
that antisubordination doctrine is properly applied to the criminal law, just
as it is applied to justify aﬃrmative action in employment and education,
because it is essential to demonstrate ‘‘a serious commitment to evaluating
and eradicating all forms of oppression.’’60 Volpp’s position appears to arise
from her fundamental view that U.S. history, culture, and law are racist,
ethnocentric, and sexist, at least to some important extent.61 Based upon
that assumption, she ‘‘argue[s] that the ‘cultural defense’ for Dong Lu Chen
[an oppressor within the cultural context at issue in his case] was inappro-
priate. . . .’’ At the same time, she ‘‘approv[es] the [informal] use of cultural
information forwomen likeHelenWu,’’ a defendant in aCalifornia casewho
killed her son (arguably in part) because she was ‘‘subordinated on the basis
of gender as well as impacted by dynamic forces from within and without
[her] communit[y.]’’62
Second, James J. Sing has argued that antidiscrimination theory ought to
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protect equally the rights of immigrant and American-born or American-
raised defendants to use culture to establish a provocation defense. He ex-
plains that ‘‘[if ] . . . the provocation defense is in essence a dominant-cultural
defense, then denying foreign defendants the right to introduce cultural evi-
dence eﬀectively denies them the use of the provocation doctrine.’’ This de-
nial, he claims, ‘‘jeopardizes cultural defendants’ rights to due process and
equality before the law’’ because it ensures that ‘‘the provocation defense . . .
would in eﬀect be available only to members of the dominant culture.’’ In
this context, Sing also acknowledges and appears to agree withVolpp’s sepa-
rate critique of my equal protection analysis; he also claims to disagree with
my view that ‘‘incorporation of a substantive cultural defense will lead to
special treatment of immigrant groups.’’63
I agree with Volpp and Sing that U.S. legal history, indeed, even con-
temporary experience, is replete with egregious examples of discrimina-
tion against minority and immigrant groups, as well as against women. I
also agree that this discrimination and its vestiges must be eradicated; our
combined work is clearly all to that end. But I fundamentally disagree with
their overarching and largely implicit theme that the United States today
has no culture that is worthy of acknowledgment or respect, and thus that
this country may not morally codify its existing norms to the exclusion of
others.64 They are wrong on both accounts. The United States is not ‘‘with-
out culture’’ or ‘‘culturally neutral’’ as they suggest.65 To the contrary, this
country has a strong cultural commitment, largely codiﬁed in the law, to an
admittedly ethnocentric vision of human and women’s rights.66 This vision
disallows respect for many of the traditional practices (although not all) that
have formed the basis of cultural defense claims.67 Speciﬁcally, it rejects cul-
turally dictated wife killing or other physical violence within the family, al-
though it continues to recognize lesser culpability for those crimes in cer-
tain circumstances applicable equally to all defendants regardless of their
cultural heritage. Respect for cultural diﬀerence does not mean acquies-
cence to all aspects of that diﬀerence no matter their eﬀect on the ability of
the dominant culture to function. Ultimately, despite the fact that culture
(including American culture) evolves and is properly inﬂuenced by a sensi-
tivity to multiculturalism,68 in the end and pragmatically speaking, ‘‘justice
is what the people in a particular community think it is.’’69
I reject Volpp’s suggestion that an appropriate response to the United
States’s history of discrimination is an aﬃrmative action excuse for certain
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subordinated criminal defendants, and Sing’s similar suggestion that such
aﬃrmative action is appropriate for all criminal defendants ‘‘with culture.’’
(While Sing claims that the injection of immigrant culture in the mix would
merely equalize things, since American defendants already have their cul-
ture codiﬁed in the law, in fact his proposal would have the eﬀect of denying
to the United States the right to codify its dominant morality in the law, and
more speciﬁcally, to give only to immigrant defendants an additional de-
fense to the criminal charge, as the judge in Chen expressly acknowledged.)
I also reject the suggestion of these two commentators that my disagree-
ment with them reﬂects a general antipathy toward other aﬃrmative action
programs. My view is quite to the contrary. Aﬃrmative action is essential
to achieve the equal protection of the laws in areas such as education and
employment, where there appears to be no equally viable alternative to en-
suring that groups that historically have been discriminated against will be
treated fairly. However, using aﬃrmative action principles in the criminal
law context would not be intended to ensure that immigrants receive equal
treatment under existing law, but rather to excuse conduct by them that
would subject a nonimmigrant to more severe punishment, and to treat the
harm to their victims as less signiﬁcant.The result clearly is a denial of equal
protection to otherwise similarly situated defendants and victims.
And, while I ﬁnd excellent Sing’s central premise that the provocation de-
fense, particularly in its more modern forms, is the most logical framework
for many and perhaps even most cases that could involve a cultural defense,
I disagree with his included argument that if an immigrant defendant is
not permitted to introduce cultural evidence in this context, he is in eﬀect
denied the use of that defense and thus the equal protection of the laws.70
There is noAmerican (or other cultural)monopoly on husbands killing their
adulterous wives; this is truly a cross-cultural phenomenon. Moreover, the
criminal law in this country, and undoubtedly elsewhere, takes into con-
sideration this ‘‘traditional practice’’ in dealing with such homicides. The
judge in Chen explicitly recognized this fact, noting that even if Chen had
not beenChinese, hewould have been guilty of voluntarymanslaughter and
not murder under New York law. The reason is that Chen may be said to
have acted as a result of an extreme emotional disturbance caused by his
wife’s inﬁdelity. If we are to believe his version of the facts, Chen lost con-
trol in the same way that a nonimmigrant American man could reasonably
be understood to lose control in similar circumstances. Thus, his defense
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of provocation did not rely upon, nor did it require for its success, the use
of cultural evidence.71
Finally, to the extent that much of the debate about the cultural defense
turns philosophical, my ﬁfth criticism of its use to negate mens rea rests
on the foundations of American political philosophy and its most tolerant
vision. That is, even the most liberal of liberal theory accepts that tolerance
for ideological and other pluralism has its limits and that, ultimately, lib-
erty must be ordered according to the harm principle.72 For example, John
StuartMill emphasized that ‘‘the sole end for whichmankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can
rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others.’’73 John Locke’s view was even more
restrictive of the government’s right to interfere with the existence and de-
velopment of plural viewpoints and behaviors; nevertheless, he recognized
that the state was entitled and even required to promulgate uniform crimi-
nal laws.74 In other words, neither Mill nor Locke assumed the possibility
of a society whose individuals could be free entirely from personal respon-
sibility for the harm they might cause others through the exercise of their
own liberties. Indeed, as the Chen case demonstrates so clearly, such a con-
ditionwould havemade individual liberty for all a logical impossibility: That
result aﬀorded liberty only to Dong Lu Chen. It placed no meaningful re-
sponsibility on him when he violated his wife’s individual rights to life and
liberty. And, taken to its logical conclusion, it does not allow the American
community to take action to change the dangerous and displaced tradition
that allegedly prompted his behavior.
And thus, the cultural defense ﬂies squarely in the face of the harm prin-
ciple, themost liberal vision of tolerance thatmay be claimed for this (or any
other) democracy. Its recognition would result in a version of liberty for the
‘‘cultural’’ defendant that was truly unbounded, so that he could act with im-
punity against the interests of his victim and of the society. Ultimately, this
brings me full-circle to my central constitutional and philosophical concern
with the cultural defense, that it denies to the victims of crime that is al-
leged to be the result of ‘‘culture’’ the rights to individual liberty and personal
safety that are promised by the American social compact. For whatever rea-
son or reasons immigrants might come to this country, their coming is very
much a ‘‘deal’’ (one that Americans are presumed to have accepted) whose
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terms include their adoption of American political culture’s vision of liberty
and their acceptance of its limitations. At bottom, this means two things.
First, for penal purposes, this culture is entitled to deﬁne the harmful devia-
tions that it accepts and those that it rejects, and it will enforce the lines thus
drawn uniformly. Second, every individual who is part of the social com-
pact—including the native born and immigrant alike—is responsible for his
or her own conformance with the law and, equally important, is entitled to
its full protection.
Applying this analysis to other and future cultural defense cases means
looking to both their doctrinal and theoretical positions, and asking the fol-
lowing questions: Are these positions based in arguments that are cogniz-
able under existing law? Do they confuse ‘‘culture’’ with ‘‘insanity’’ or some
lesser version of diminished mental capacity, so that they are inherently
illogical and, at the same time, racist?Do they seek to deny the existence and
relevance of free will in a context that does not involve a true case of mental
disease, disorder, or defect? Is their eﬀect to protect or to deny crime victims
who happen not to be white equal protection of the laws? And, ﬁnally, are
they based in a respect for or a denial of the harm principle and its under-
lying premise that democratic society must be ordered at least by a uniform
system of criminal laws? In the end, these questions, based on the paradigm
established in Chen, should provide some guidance to those who would at-
tempt to disentangle the merits of cases in which culture is cloaked in mens
rea, and thereby oﬀered as an excuse for otherwise criminal conduct.
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